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Introduction
1 
 
In 1999 the centre-right won the European Parliament (EP) elections. The Chrstian 
Democrats and Conservatives of the European People’s Party (EPP) opted to use their 
position of increased strength vis-à-vis the losing Party of European Socialists (PES) 
to conclude an agreement with the smaller Liberal (ELDR) Group at the expense of 
the former. The agreement covered the election of Parliament’s President in 1999 and 
2002, the logrolling of important committee chairs between the two groups, and a new 
status for the ELDR as the preferred interlocutor of the EPP on policy matters. 
Before 1999, this type of agreement had existed between the two largest groups, the 
EPP and PES, for a decade. In 2004, the EPP/ED
2 opted to revert to it, substituting the 
PES for the ELDR. The return to full consensus between the two largest groups shows 
that the Parliament’s consensual mechanisms were too strong to fray even when 
conditions appeared ripe for change. 
This paper argues that the changing agreements for accessing influential positions 
within the European Parliament’s hierarchy did not in fact affect the proportional 
allocation of office in the Parliament following the 1999 elections. With the 
presidency excepted, the PES were in no sense excluded from accessing positions in 
proportion to their group’s size.  
Although competition on legislative matters may have increased, the paper tests the 
hypothesis that the proportional distribution of office has remained intact. It analyses 
how the assignment of office has modified since 1994, given the enhancement of the 
Parliament’s institutional powers following Maastricht and Amsterdam, increased 
                                                
1 I would like to thank Ernesto Calvo, Simon Hix, Christopher Lord and Gail McElroy for helpful 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks are also due to the British Academy (award OCG-
46274) for financial assistance in attending this conference. 
2 The Group of the EPP changed its name to EPP/ED (EPP/European Democrats) in 1999 to widen its 
appeal to Conservative parties outside the Christian Democratic tradition.   3 
institutional powers, and changing representation of government and opposition 
parties in the European institutions, and the Enlargement of 2004 that led to the arrival 
of 162 MEPs from the new member states. On occasions, where the distribution of 
office is not proportional, this is a consequence of self-exclusion, rather than 
competition with winners and losers. 
The first part of the paper introduces a theory of office distribution and explains 
how the main hypothesis will be tested. The second part of the paper addresses the 
competition for the office of President of the Parliament since 2007, before covering 
the distribution of parliamentary vice-presidencies between the groups. The allocation 
of the policy-related committee chairs is the subject of the next section, at the end of 
which I present two specific quantitative hypotheses concerned with office positions 
between and within the groups. In the fourth section, those hypotheses are tested. 
   4 
1. Why Consensus? From Office to Policy 
 
The assignment of positions is normally agreed in advance by the main political 
groups, which only contest elections when consensus breaks down. The distribution of 
internal parliamentary positions offers political group leaders the chance to share out 
goods among their members. Research by McElroy (2001) has shown that political 
groups have always recognised committees as a potential supply of incentives and 
patronage. If national interests can be reconciled in a transnational system, these cases 
show that politicians prefer an equitable division of offices and resources, so that 
multinational and multiparty power sharing can be maintained. Kreppel (2002: 202) 
concludes that national delegations determine the allocation of office, having 
dismissed voting behaviour or attendance levels as influential factors. However, she 
does not consider why some nationalities are consistently under represented within the 
groups, even if proportionality applies as a general rule. 
As a political system, the European Union meets all the criteria of Lijphart (1984) 
for a consensus democracy. We should therefore expect a proportional distribution of 
important office positions between the political groups. My prediction is that whereas 
parties distribute less influential office to smaller delegations in order to retain unity 
so that everyone gets something, the more influential positions are a prize considered 
worthy of contestation but within Parliament’s embedded mechanisms of consensus. 
These mechanisms are path dependent (Pierson 2000), because an optimal alternative 
of a majoritarian system with winners and losers is rejected in view of the sunk costs 
of risking the loss of power in the long run.  
The hypothesis will be tested using a qualitative analysis of events that have taken 
place since 1994 in the next sections. These will be followed by the presentationa and   5 
testing of quantitative hypotheses to measure proportionality in the assignment of 
positions, whether as committee chairs, between political groups and their constituent 
national parties. Although I do not expect the obvious identification of winners and 
losers in this context, it is likely that within the political groups, national delegations 
whose attendance records are low, who lack a high number of experts or suffer from 
high turnover will be under represented. 
The share of parliamentary positions allocated in a consensus system would lead us 
to presuppose that a proportional distribution of office would occur within the 
European Parliament. This is the case in systems such as that of Switzerland, where 
the major parties of parliament are all represented in government and among the 
chairs of parliamentary committees. Parliamentary positions are also allocated in 
Belgium, Germany, and even the UK, in which a parliamentary opposition excluded 
from the executive is nevertheless granted access to positions within the parliamentary 
hierarchy. France, Spain and, since 1994, Italy have systems where the opposition is 
also excluded from influential positions in the legislature. While a fully competitive 
system would be characterised by the total exclusion of an opposition from positions 
such as chair of parliamentary committee, as in France or Italy, a consensual system is 
characterised by the proportional distribution of such positions. 
Carroll, Cox and Pachon (2004) define committee chairs and what they call ‘board 
members’, equivalent to members of the Enlarged Bureau (President, Vice-Presidents 
and Quaestors) as ‘mega-seats’. I shall follow them by using this term in for the rest 
of the paper.  
   6 
 
2. The Parliamentary Bureau and Left-Right Competition 
 
This section analyses the extent of consensus and competition that exists between 
the political groups in the assignment of places on the Parliament’s (enlarged) Bureau. 
This is the body that leads Parliament, and consists of the President, Vice-Presidents, 
and Quaestors. The first part of the section focuses on the consensus that existed 
between the EPP and PES Groups in the assignment of the Parliament’s President 
until 1999. The second part argues that consensus is maintained between the five 
largest political groups and many of the larger national party delegations in the 
appointments to the less powerful members of the Bureau, while the third part 
examines the extent to which the events of 1999 may have heralded a new era of 
competition in the elections of for the Parliament’s presidency, prior to reverting to 
the “Grand Coalition” in 2004. 
At least one position on the Bureau is assigned to a member from the two main 
political parties of the four or five largest states. Application of the D'Hondt method
3 
of proportionality between the groups will also mean that some of the smaller groups, 
like the ELDR or Greens, gain something. Beyond that, the tendency is to allocate 
additional mega-seats to some of the smaller national party delegations within the two 
large political groups. Committee chairs are allocated in a similar way within the two 
large groups. A large delegation, like the British Labour Party or French Socialists, is 
usually able to chair an important committee and gain a vice-presidency of 
Parliament. Meanwhile, the smaller delegations from states like Greece or Sweden 
will only be able to gain the leadership of a committee or a vice-presidency (but not 
                                                
3 This is illustrated in Table 2.   7 
both) and usually have to revolve such positions between them. For example, a 
Swedish Social Democrat chaired the Women's Committee in 1999 but this passed to 
a Greek Socialist in 2002, with neither delegation holding office during the other 
period. 
 
 
2.1. The President of the European Parliament, 1994-1999 
 
 
 
The office of President is the most contested position within the Parliament’s 
internal hierarchy. The President presides over the opening of each plenary session, 
keeping order and has a substantial administrative role. S/he chairs the Parliament 
Bureau of Vice-Presidents and chairs the Conference of Presidents, which is the 
committee of political group leaders that decides the agenda of Parliament and 
ultimately brokers agreements between the groups. The President is also the 
Parliament’s external representative and meets with the Presidents of the other EU 
institutions, addresses the European Council, and attends IGCs. 
Between 1989 and 1999, the PES and EPP revolved the presidency between them, 
the then larger PES Group holding it during the first half of each parliamentary term 
and the EPP holding it during the second half. Although the member parties of the 
PES and EPP usually compete against each other for governmental office at national 
level, it was decided that at the level of the European Parliament both groups had 
more to gain by co-operating. This allowed the Parliament to present itself as a more 
united institution on occasions when there was consensus for it to stand up to the other 
institutions, as discussed by Hix, Kreppel, and Noury (2003: 319). It also facilitated 
reaching the absolute majority thresholds for amending legislation under the co-
operation and co-decision procedures introduced respectively by the SEA in 1987 and   8 
the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. Speaking before the election of a parliamentary 
Vice-President in 1998, Wilfried Martens, President of the EPP Group, defended the 
arrangement and argued the Parliament could not enjoy the luxury of division: 
 
‘During the present legislature there was an agreement between the most important 
groups, the Group of European Socialists and ours… We see the above rule as a 
fundamental rule for our Parliament. The position of our Parliament remains extremely 
fragile.’
4 
 
 
 
Table 1: Unsuccessful Mega-Seat Competition, 1994-2007 
Year  Mega-seat  Challenger  Support  Votes 
1994  Vice-President of EP  Ripa di Maena  Greens, ERA, EUL, 
some PES and ELDR  234 
1994  Chair of Research 
Committee
5  Désama  PES, EUL, Greens, 
ERA  13 
1997  President  Lalumière  EUL, Greens, ERA 
(Radicals), some PES  177 
1998  Vice-President of EP  Bloch von 
Blottnitz  Greens, some PES  141 
1999 
and 
2002 
Fontaine and Cox elected as President as part of EPP/ED-ELDR deal, with 
PES challenge 
2004  President  Geremek  ALDE, UEN, Greens, 
some EPP/ED  208 
2007  President  Frassoni  Greens, EUL, some 
PES and ALDE  145 
 
At the time of the election of the President in 1994 and at other times, 
representatives of the smaller groups protested about their 'undemocratic exclusion' 
from positions of influence in the Parliament.
6  The view of the larger groups is that 
there is nothing “undemocratic” about a system that reflects an embedded consensus 
between those large groups and that shares out mega-seats that carry policy influence 
across groups according to proportionate size. Consensus within Parliament does not 
                                                
4 Verbatim Report of Proceedings of the European Parliament, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 17 June 1998. 
5 The election was limited to members of the Committee only, with 13 voting for Désama and 12 
voting for his Forza Europa opponent, Umberto Scapagnini. 
6 Verbatim Report of Proceedings of the European Parliament, Official Journal of the European 
Communities 19 July 1994.   9 
mean that there is no conflict, rather it means that conflict is contained within 
consensual mechanisms. The consensus between the large groups has always 
prevailed, despite being challenged unsuccessfully on numerous occasions illustrated 
in Table 1. 
 
2.2. The Vice-Presidents and Quaestors 
 
Fourteen parliamentary Vice-Presidents and five Quaestors
7 are also elected at the 
constitutive session, although the number of posts allocated to the different political 
groups is normally agreed in advance. Institutional change has not affected elections 
for these mega-seats, which has remained consensual. The elections for Quaestors are 
contested more often and on the basis of personality connected to the office of 
Quaestor. These mega-seats tend to be contested only by an excluded group or 
independent-minded MEPs who do not accept the decisions of the group leaderships 
in selecting candidates, and is hardly significant in terms of the relative lack of 
importance of these posts. 
The Vice-Presidents deputise for the President in official functions, revolve the task 
of chairing plenary sessions between each other and the President and, with the 
President, are members of the Bureau. The Enlarged Bureau includes the Quaestors. 
Three of the Vice-Presidents drawn from the two large groups also sit as permanent 
members of the Parliament-Council Conciliation Committee, under the co-decision 
procedure. 
Application of the D’Hondt method, agreed by the major groups, is applied in 
elections for the Bureau seats, illustrating the level of institutionalised consensus in 
                                                
7 Quaestors manage the facilities available for MEPs. In 2007, their number was increased from 5 to 6.   10 
the form of unwritten rules. The D’Hondt system does not appear in the Parliament’s 
Rules of Procedure. The entitlement to Bureau seats is reduced by two for the group 
holding the Presidency of the Parliament. It was practice to elect two Quaestors from 
each of the two large groups and one from a small group. In 1994 after the election of 
a PES President, the D’Hondt method allowed for the election of six EPP, five 
Socialists, one Liberal, one EUL, and one Forza Europa (FE) Vice-Presidents (Table 
4). However, the nomination of a candidate from Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Europa 
was contested by the Greens and other left-wing MEPs. In the ensuing debate, Ria 
Oomen-Ruijten of the EPP shared the concern of Martens for the delicate balance in 
the Parliament and insisted the observance of the D’Hondt formula meant voting for 
Alessandro Fontana
8 of Forza Europa. At the third ballot Fontana was elected with 
278 votes against 234 for the Green candidate, Carlo Ripa di Maena. Although this 
election was contested, the result was that the unwritten rules of consensus were 
maintained (Table 1). 
 
2.3. Substituting Liberals for Socialists in 1999: Competition or Continuity? 
 
In 1999 the EPP became the largest group for the first time, providing it with the 
opportunity of establishing itself in a more influential position, with the help of the 
ELDR. This was an incentive for the agreement of the two groups, with the EPP being 
‘determined to vehemently fight attempts to introduce a socialist agenda in Europe’.
9 
On this occasion, the competition leading to an exclusion of the PES was an exception 
that proved the consensual rule. While the EPP/ED and ELDR groups chose to 
logroll, the PES continued to access mega-seats and influence according to the 
                                                
8 Verbatim Report of Proceedings of the European Parliament, Official Journal of the European 
Communities, 19 July 1994. 
9 EPP Action Programme, 1999-2004, Brussels, February 1999.   11 
D’Hondt method. The EPP/ED and ELDR emphasised the need for political balance 
between the institutions: 
 
‘The delicate balance between the EU institutions and national parliaments may be 
disrupted by excessive politicisation and a disregard for the balance of power.’
10 
 
 
 
‘The ELDR believes in making this agreement with the EPP that through the 
European Parliament we contribute in some way to restoring a broad political 
equilibrium between the various political forces in the EU even if institution by 
institution and case by case such balances cannot exist.’
11 
 
 
 
Besides being assured EPP/ED support for the bid of Patrick Cox, Leader of the 
ELDR Group, to become President of the Parliament in succession to its own 
candidate Nicole Fontaine, the agreement extended to the ELDR being allocated the 
chair of the Citizens’ Freedoms and Rights Committee. Both groups also agreed to 
work towards the creation of common statutes for MEPs and their assistants. 
The ELDR was keen to emphasise the limits of the agreement with the EPP/ED and 
the fact that on issues not connected to the constitutive agreement, it would operate 
independently, taking advantage of its pivotal status between the two larger groups: 
 
‘It is an agreement in relation to the constitutive sessions of the European Parliament 
over the coming five years. It is not a political coalition… We cherish our policy 
integrity and independence and in our negotiations insisted on maintaining our right to 
pursue our own policy agenda within the European Parliament, seeking coalitions to 
our left or to our right as appropriate on a case by case basis.’
12 
 
 
 
One of the effects of the separation of powers on the European Parliament is the 
absence of a government-opposition dynamic, so that political groups have always 
                                                
10 EPP Action Programme, 1999-2004, Brussels, February 1999. 
11 ELDR press release, Brussels, 15 July 1999. 
12 ELDR press release, Brussels, 15 July 1999.   12 
been free to construct case-by-case alliances. This occurred for roll call votes as well 
as the election of the President of Parliament. The separation of powers, flexible 
alliance approach, and a belief in ‘balance’ characterised the approach of the ELDR 
Group in 1999, since this allowed them to maximise their pivotal influence. In 1999, 
Nicole Fontaine was elected President with 306 votes, coming from the EPP/ED, 
Liberals, and possibly a few Socialists. Mario Soares of the PES had 200 votes from 
members of the PES and EUL Groups, while Heidi Hautala of the Greens received 49 
votes. 
 
Table 2: Votes cast in the election for 
President of the Parliament, January 2002 
 
Candidate  Supported by  Round 1  Round 2  Round 3 
Patrick Cox  EPP/ED, ELDR  254  277  298 
David Martin  PES  184  226  237 
Jens-Peter Bonde  EDD,  some  UEN, 
EPP/ED 
66  76  33 
Francis Wurtz  EUL  42  -  - 
Gérard Onesta  Greens  37  -  - 
Total votes    590  592  586 
Void votes    7  13  18 
Valid votes    583  579  568 
Necessary majority   292  290  285 
 
 
 
Table 2 illustrates the distribution of votes that took place in January 2002 in the 
election of the Parliament’s President. Pat Cox, the leader of the ELDR, was duly 
elected President with the support of the EPP/ED Group, honouring the alliance of 
1999. He was challenged unsuccessfully by the excluded groups, including the PES. 
Nevertheless, the Socialists were very much included in the attribution of mega-seats 
later that week. 
In 2004, following the arrival of 164 MEPs from the new member states, increasing 
the EP’s membership to 732, positions continued to be allocated between groups,   13 
according to the D’Hondt method. The one “majoritarian” post, the Presidency, 
became the subject of a new agreement between the EPP/ED and the PES, excluding 
the Liberals, as had been the case before 1999. 
The assignment of the chairs of the Parliament’s committees works in a similar way. 
However, it is practice for smaller delegations that do not have a place on the Bureau 
to be allocated a committee chair. This will be examined in the next section. 
 
3. Competition and Co-operation for the Assignment of Committee Chairs 
 
 
 
The increased legislative power of the Parliament since the late 1980s means that the 
committees are much more closely linked with outcomes in European level 
legislation. The European Parliament is a committee-based legislature. As a result we 
would expect the group leaderships to take an active interest in which MEPs are 
appointed to committees. The experience of an MEP and the extent of his or her 
specialisation in a particular policy area will influence the decisions of group 
leaderships in assigning both the membership of specific committees and the 
allocation of the committee chairs to which each political group is entitled. Cox and 
McCubbins (1993) suggest that the committees of the US Congress are instruments of 
parties and facilitate the passing of legislation. Cox and McCubbins (1993) view 
Congressional parties as vehicles for the assignment of mega-seats that enable 
legislators to access the resources that in turn assist with the distribution of 
constituency benefits that will secure re-election. Krehbiel (1991) on the other hand 
views committees as a means for accessing information by the legislature so that it 
can improve the legislative specialisation and eventual output of its members. Both of   14 
these characteristics apply to the EP, although policy outcomes are more relevant for 
the careers of MEPs than direct constituency benefits. 
As mentioned before, during the 1994-1999 Parliament Wilfried Martens 
emphasised the need for mega-seats to be distributed between political groups in strict 
proportionality in order that Parliament, dependent on the consensus of the major 
political tendencies, not be endangered. While individual delegations within the 
groups determine which of their members are appointed to specific committees, the 
assignment of chairs is left to the groups as a whole and then to the larger delegations 
thereof, in a similar way to the distribution of office within the Bureau. However, the 
groups and larger delegations within them are constrained by the demands of 
seniority. Although there are cases of MEPs without previous experience being 
elected to senior committee positions, these are more the exception than the rule. In 
1999, seniority as defined in the previous section
13 applied to each of the seventeen 
committee chairs, except for the Chair of the Petitions Committee  
Literature on coalition formation focuses on the formation of governments, 
including explanations of which parties are likely to bid for which ministries (Budge 
and Keman 1993). To an extent, a similar methodology can be applied to the 
legislative coalition of all the political groups that are large enough to obtain at least 
one committee chair. Budge and Keman (1993: 53) argue that Ministries are normally 
allocated in proportion to the seats that government parties hold in a Parliament. Some 
parties are interested in particular Ministries more than others. Budge and Keman 
(1993: 102) found that of the 65 different European governments analysed over an 
historical time period that contained agrarian parties, in 54 cases the Ministry of 
Agriculture was held by agrarians. In governments where agrarian parties are absent 
                                                
13 Long service in the EP or in a senior role in national politics.   15 
but Christian Democrats are present the latter take the Ministry of Agriculture on 83 
percent of occasions. In cases when Socialists are in government, they tend to take the 
Ministries concerned with social affairs, employment and health. If the Socialists are 
absent from government, these Ministries revert to socially conscious Christian 
Democrats rather than free market Liberals. In a grand coalition comprising Socialists 
and Christian Democrats, we would expect the Socialists to take the social ministries 
and the Christian Democrats to take Agriculture, without dispute. However, 
competition might occur between the two not only on the major offices like Foreign 
Affairs and Finance, but also on Education if the church-secular cleavage were strong. 
The fact that some parties in a coalition want certain ministries that interest other 
parties far less, while the competition for certain other ministries may be intense is 
equally true when it comes to sharing out committee chairs in the European 
Parliament. 
Carroll, Cox and Pachon (2004) collected data from the legislatures of 57 states in 
order to measure whether such posts were allocated between parties according to 
majoritarian or proportional norms. They link those norms to the party system type 
that is in force. Significantly they find that ‘board seats’ are distributed between 
parties in a less proportionate way than committee chairs. Allocation of seats on the 
EP’s Bureau is highly proportional, but maybe that is difficult to avoid given the size 
of its membership at 20, rising to 21 in 2007. 
Bowler and Farrell (1995: 227) confirm that competition for the membership of 
certain committees makes them reasonably representative of the EP as a whole. For 
example, business and labour are both well represented on the Parliament’s social, 
economic, and industrial committees. The agrarian and fisheries sectors are over 
represented on the Agriculture and Fisheries Committees (Varela 2001), while   16 
opponents of the Agricultural and Fisheries policies are less well represented, maybe 
preferring the Budgets, Budgetary Control, or Environment Committees. 
As the institutional powers of the Parliament have been enhanced, some committees 
have gained more power than others, so that the political groups target some more 
than others for reasons of policy. Until the late 1980s, when the Parliament had only 
consultative power the Chair of the Agriculture Committee was covetted by the EPP 
Group, on account of the share of the EU budget that the Common Agricultural Policy 
received at the time. Although still large, the share of the budget devoted to 
Agriculture has since fallen, no substantial legislative power has been given to the 
Parliament in the field of agriculture, while the powers of the Parliament have 
increased in other policy areas, whose budget allocations have likewise grown. 
Consequently, the Chair of the Agriculture Committee is no longer so highly 
demanded by the EPP/ED which would prefer to gain the chairs of the committees on 
the Environment, Economic and Monetary Affairs, Foreign Policy, Budgetary 
Control, and Regions. The Greens also grew in strength, increasing their number from 
22 in 1994 to 48 in 1999 and have developed policy interests in agriculture, which led 
them to assume the Chair of the Agriculture Committee.  
McElroy (2001) considers various methods for ranking, including those formulated 
by Groseclose and Stewart (1998), whereby we can count the number of transfers 
from one committee to another and conclude that the committees gaining new 
members are the important ones. McElroy's application of this approach to the period 
before 1999 shows that the Development Committee was more highly ranked that the 
External Economic Relations Committee, although the Development Committee is 
less powerful. The explanation for this must be that power alone is not the only force 
in motivating the choice of MEPs. Development issues may be more appealing for   17 
left-wing representatives without specialisation in trade issues, who would find 
membership of the External Economic Relations Committee uninspiring. In terms of 
ranking the order of committee preferences, comparisons with the US Congress are 
not helpful. The EP has a much higher turnover than Congress. National delegations 
often have pre-ordained senior members that will be appointed to whichever 
committee chairs are available. 
One method used to rank committees in absolute terms is to measure the quantity of 
legislation that they consider, particularly under the co-decision procedure. The 
assumption is that a powerful legislative committee is the first choice of most MEPs. 
However, this does not cover issues that may be of personal interest to individual 
MEPs, sufficient for them to opt for membership of largely consultative committees. 
In 1999, Michel Rocard, the pre-ordained candidate of the French Socialists to chair a 
committee was moved from heading the Development to the Employment and Social 
Affairs Committee, effectively a promotion. He was displeased with this since he had 
a personal affection for development issues and approached the EUL Group, which 
had opted to head the Development Committee from its remaining choices.
14 The 
EUL Group was content to exchange Development for Employment and Social 
Affairs with Rocard, although neither the French Socialist delegation nor the PES 
Group were in agreement, so that Rocard was compelled to accept his “promotion”. 
The ranking method that I use is not absolute. The leadership of each committee is 
decided firstly between the groups, and then between the national delegations within 
each group, according to the D'Hondt method. Table 3 shows the logical place within 
the “pecking order” that the larger national delegations have. The D’Hondt method 
                                                
14 Meeting of the EUL Group, Strasbourg, July 1999.   18 
has been used for assigning positions between the groups since the Parliament was 
directly-elected in 1979 (Kreppel 2002: 189) and is now institutionalised. 
 
Table 3: Logical attribution of committee chairs to political 
groups and national party delegations in 1999, according to 
number of seats, calculated by the D’Hondt formula 
Preference Group  Seats  Delegation  Seats 
1  EPP/ED  233  CDU-CSU  53 
  reduced to  116.5    26.5 
2  PES  180  SPD  33 
  reduced to  90    16.5 
3  EPP/ED  116.5  Cons  36 
  reduced to  77.7    18 
4  PES  90  Labour  29 
  reduced to  60    14.5 
5  EPP/ED  77.7  PP  28 
  reduced to  58.3    14 
6  PES  60  PSOE  24 
  reduced to  45    12 
7  EPP/ED  58.3  CDU-CSU  26.5 
  reduced to  46.6    17.7 
8  ELDR  51  LibDem  10 
  reduced to  25.5    5 
9  Greens  48  Verts  9 
  reduced to  24    4.5 
10  EPP/ED  46.6  Forza  21 
  reduced to  38.8    10.5 
11  PES  45  PS (F)  22 
  reduced to  36    11 
12  EUL  42  PCF or PDS 6 
  reduced to  21    3 
13  EPP/ED  38.8  Cons  18 
  reduced to  33.3    12 
14  PES  36  DS-SDI  17 
  reduced to  30    8.5 
15  EPP/ED  33.3  CDU-CSU  17.7 
  reduced to  29.1    13.3 
6  PES  30  SPD  16.5 
  reduced to  25.7    11 
17  EPP/ED  29.1  PP  14 
  reduced to  25.9    9.3 
 
 
In 1994 and 1997, following the Budge and Keman (1993) analysis we can imagine 
that the chairs of any of the six or seven most popular committees would have been   19 
attractive to either of the main groups. As mentioned above, the unwritten agreement 
between the PES and EPP to allocate social and environment committees to the PES 
and economic committees to the EPP was terminated in 1999. The increasing 
legislative and regulatory profile of the Environment Committee whose influence over 
consumer policy was growing in the wake of BSE, dioxin and genetically modified 
foods made its chair a target for the EPP/ED Group. In turn the EPP/ED was prepared 
to sacrifice the chair of the Economic and Monetary Committee. However, in 1994 
despite its limited powers, the Agriculture Committee retained its importance, at least 
in so far as overseeing the Common Agricultural Policy and yet its chair was allotted 
to the small EDA (Gaullist) Group, which had only the sixteenth choice from the 
committees. Other less prestigious committees, also with limited powers but with 
lower policy budgets at European level were preferred by the larger delegations, 
which found them more relevant than Agriculture. By 1999, Agriculture had become 
a priority policy area for the Greens, not least on account of food scares and its 
connection to environmental policy. The improved representation of the Green Group 
also meant that it was entitled to the ninth rather than twentieth choice of committee. 
As Table 4 shows, the allocation of committee chairs and Bureau seats between the 
groups in 2004-2007 followed the D’Hondt formula with no more hiccups than usual. 
In 2007, competition occurred within the EPP/ED Group on the allocation of its 
Bureau seats and committee chairs. The Polish PO failed to have its candidate 
accepted, according to the unwritten rules, for a Vice-Presidency of the Parliament. 
After some weeks, PO was successful in claiming the first choice of EPP/ED 
committee chair as “compensation”. For a small delegation (15 MEPs) taking the 
chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, meant displacing Elmar Brok of the CDU-
CSU (49 MEPs). As the largest delegation of the largest group, the CDU-CSU had   20 
controlled this committee, exercising the first choice among all delegations. The 
CDU-CSU exercised second choice within the Group, displacing the British 
Conservatives on the Industry Committee, who were demoted to Agriculture.
15  
On the rare occasions that competition emerged, as with the fourteenth vice-
presidency of Parliament or Chair of the Research Committee in 1994, the end of 
logrolling between the EPP and PES in 1999, and the dispute with the EPP/ED in 
2007, the result was the reconfirmation of embedded consensus, the eventual election 
of the “correct candidate”, or compensation for his party in the case of the PO, and 
continued observance of the D’Hondt mechanism. Although the CDU-CSU and 
British Conservatives were “demoted” in 2007, they still retained their correct number 
of mega-seats. Competition between and within political groups exists in the 
European Parliament, but it is contained within embedded mechanisms of consensus. 
This leads me to develop the following, more specific hypotheses: 
 
H1:   that the allocation of committee chairs and Bureau seats between the groups 
has remained consistently proportional, according to the D’Hondt formula 
since 1994. 
 
H2:   that within the EPP/ED and PES groups, the allocation of “mega-seats” 
between national party delegations has remained proportional. 
 
The first hypothesis will be tested by running the D’Hondt formula against the seat 
totals of each of the political groups since 1994 to establish whether each group has 
received its “correct” share of committee chairs and bureau seats. 
The second hypothesis will be tested through the means of correlations and Poisson 
regressions. The mega-seats in question are EP Bureau seats, including the President, 
the leaders of each of the two large groups, committee chairs, and group coordinators 
(leaders) on each of the committees. In order to create a consistent dataset, the 
                                                
15 euobserver.com, 24
th, 25
th, 30
th January 2007.   21 
selection of type of mega-seats is subjective, but goes beyond those prescribed by 
Carroll, Cox and Pachon (2004), with the inclusion of committee coordinators. Vice-
chairmen of some of the committees are considered important, as are the vice-
presidencies of some of the political groups, but not the PES. The selection of Poisson 
regressions is appropriate since the dependent variable (the number of mega-seats per 
national party) is a count whose allocation does not depend directly on the allocation 
of seats elsewhere, while all variables are whole integers and none are set at less than 
zero. 
   
4. Positions between and within the Political Groups 
 
 
 
While the previous section analysed the share of committee chairs between the 
groups and presented the hypotheses, this section tests them. In the first part, the 
D’Hondt formula is used to test the level of its observance in allocating mega-seats 
between rather than within the groups.   The subsequent sub-sections test the second 
hypothesis by concentrating on the share of positions between national delegations 
within each of the large groups. The section concludes with Poisson regressions of the 
distribution of positions within the two large groups. Even if on balance, such 
distribution is proportional, this analysis will illustrate the extent of any skew in that 
proportionality according to relevant control variables. 
 
4.1 Seats on the Parliament’s Bureau and Committee Chairmen 
 
Table 4 displays the results of the allocation of committee chairmen and Bureau 
seats between the political groups since 1994. In each case, the ‘actual numbers’ are   22 
the quantity of committee chairmen or Bureau members assigned to each group, while 
the columns marked ‘D’Hondt Allocation’ are the share that would have been 
allocated if the D’Hondt formula were perfectly applied. This takes into account an 
unwritten norm that the Group filling the Presidency of the Parliament loses two other 
seats on the Bureau. 
We can see that the allocations follow the D’Hondt formula almost to the letter. 
Committee chairmen were perfectly assigned except in 1994 and 2004. In 1994, 
although too small to gain a committee chairman, the Greens were nevertheless 
allocated one at the expense of the EPP. In 2004, the Eurosceptic Independence and 
Democracy (ID) Group with 37 MEPs spurned the offer of the chairmanship of the 
Petitions Committee, in preference to a senior vice-chairmanship of the Environment 
Committee.
16 The leadership of the Petitions Committee was allocated to the smaller 
UEN Group instead. 
Consistent with the comparative findings of Carroll, Cox and Pachon (2004) across 
56 legislatures, the allocation of seats on the Bureau is marginally less proportional. 
There are 20 seats on the Bureau, which rose to 21 in 2007. They were allocated in 
synchrony with the D’Hondt formula in 2002. Of the 20 seats, three were “misplaced” 
in 2004 and in the other years between one and two, at the expense of the smaller 
groups. 
Committee chairmen have been allocated according to the D’Hondt norms between 
the groups, with any disproportionality actually favouring smaller groups like the 
Greens in 1994 and the UEN in 2004. Meanwhile the disproportionality of up to 10 
percent on the Bureau has not excluded those smaller groups. Unless they self-
exclude, all groups with at least 30 MEPs (now equivalent to around 4 percent of the 
                                                
16 Interview, Jens-Peter Bonde MEP, leader of the ID Group, Brussels, July 2004.   23 
total) can gain control of at least one committee chair or Bureau seat. This shows that 
Hypothesis 1 is correct. 
 Table 4: Allocation of Committee Chairs and Bureau Members to Political Groups 
in reality and according to the D’Hondt formula 
  1994  1997  1999  2002  2004  2007 
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COMMITTEE CHAIRS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EPP/ED  155  6  7  181  7  7  233  8  8  232  8  8  268  9  9  277  9  9 
PES  201  9  9  216  8  8  180  6  6  179  6  6  198  7  7  217  7  7 
ELDR-ALDE  43  1  1  38  1  1  51  1  1  53  1  1  88  3  3  106  3  3 
Greens  21  1  0  28  1  1  48  1  1  45  1  1  42  1  1  42  1  1 
ERA  21  0  0  21  0  0                             
EUL/NGL  28  1  1  33  1  1  42  1  1  44  1  1  41  1  1  41  1  1 
EDA-UPE-UEN  29  1  1  58  2  2  21  0  0  22  0  0  27  1  0  44  1  1 
FE  29  1  1                                   
IEN-EDD-ID  15  0  0  15  0  0  16  0  0  18  0  0  37  0  1  24  0  0 
TDI-ITS                    18  0  0                    21  0  0 
BUREAU MEMBERS                                                   
EPP/ED  155  8  8  181  6  5  233  8  7  232  10  10  268  10  9  277  8  6 
PES  201  8  7  216  9  10  180  8  8  179  7  7  198  6  4  217  7  8 
ELDR-ALDE  43  1  2  38  1  1  51  2  2  53  1  1  88  2  3  106  3  4 
Greens  21  0  0  28  0  1  48  1  2  45  1  1  42  1  1  42  1  1 
ERA  21  0  0  21  0  0                             
EUL/NGL  28  2  1  33  2  1  42  1  1  44  1  1  41  1  1  41  1  1 
EDA-UPE-UEN  29  0  1  58  2  2  21  0  0  22  0  0  27  0  1  44  1  1 
FE  29  1  1                                   
IEN-EDD-ID  15  0  0  15  0  0  16  0  0  18  0  0  37  0  1  24  0  0 
TDI-ITS                18  0  0                21  0  0   26 
4.2. Committee Co-ordinators 
 
The main political groups appoint a co-ordinator or group leader on each of the 
committees, who takes responsibility for that policy area. As such they act on behalf 
of the group’s wider leadership (Whitaker 2001). They make sure that the members of 
their groups are allocated influential reports. Whitaker’s evidence suggests that once a 
group is assigned an important report, the co-ordinator decides which of his or her 
MEPs will actually be the rapporteur. Rapporteurs write the legislative report for the 
committee and build consensus in committee and across Parliament for proposals to 
be passed, where necessary being part of Parliament’s negotiating team with the 
Council and Commission. Whitaker addresses whether committees are run more by 
their chairs, which would suggest that they are institutionally independent, or by the 
co-ordinators, in which case we could conclude that the political groups are the main 
arbiters of the Parliament. The interview data collected indicate that neither the chairs 
nor co-ordinators prevail over the other. 
Within the two large groups, one startling fact is the very small number of 
constituent parties from which the co-ordinators are drawn (Appendix: Tables A1 and 
A2). Whereas the other mega-seats mentioned above are distributed roughly 
proportionately, the office of co-ordinator is not. It is assigned to those MEPs who 
choose to specialise in particular areas and who are committed to remaining in the 
European Parliament for more than one term. This eliminates those who come from 
member states whose delegations have a tradition of high turnover. 
Of the EPP/ED co-ordinators elected in 2004, six were German, five were British, 
five were Spanish, two were Dutch, two were Greek, with one each coming from   28 
Austria, Italy and Ireland, with none from France. In 1999, there were no co-
ordinators among either group’s 51 Italian or 43 French members. It is the members 
of the British, German, and Spanish member parties of the PES that occupy the 
leading positions of policy held by the Group, mirroring the case of the EPP/ED, at 
least until the 2004 elections. 
 
4.3. Mega-seats within the EPP/ED and PES Groups 
 
Together with the previous sub-section, here I investigate Hypothesis 2 concerning 
the proportionality of mega-seat distribution within the political gropus. The analysis 
is limited to the EPP/ED and PES Groups only. The other smaller groups are not 
included. This is because they tend to be allocated one committee chair and 
parliamentary vice-presidency for the whole group and so far as their committee co-
ordinators are concerned, it could happen that more than one-third of a group’s 
members are co-ordinators. This was the case for the ELDR in 1994, when 20 
committee co-ordinators were drawn from 43 MEPs in total.  
Evaluations of correlations between mega-seats and the size of national party 
delegations will follow. The subsection concludes with the Poisson regressions of 
mega-seats internal to both large groups. 
 
Table 5: Correlations between mega-seats and sizes of national party 
delegations in the EPP and PES Groups, 1994-2007 
  1994 & 1997  1999 & 2002  2004 & 2007 
EPP  0.959  0.948  0.918 
PES  0.978  0.842  0.795 
 
A high degree of proportionality within the groups applied in the 1994 Parliament. 
The correlations fell significantly in both 1999 and in the Parliament elected in 2004.   29 
However, a figure of .795 still indicates significant proportionality on this scale. 
Besides “competition”, reasons for decreasing proportionality include not just the 
arrival of larger numbers of inexperienced MEPs as a consequence of EU 
Enlargement per se, but a growing total number of disparate political parties joining 
the two large groups leading to significant heterogeneity in which some will play a 
more marginal role. 
An important caveat on these data is that they measure mega-seats held, purely in 
terms of numbers, without a system of weighting for more important positions. To be 
President of the Parliament is more important than to be Group Co-ordinator on the 
Petitions Committee, but these qualitative considerations are not factored in. 
Running a Poisson regression is helpful in balancing the fact that many small 
delegations could have extreme variation in the dependent variable of mega-seats, 
ranging from a ratio of zero to 1.0. Poisson regressions allow for counts where all the 
variables are integers and many of the dependent variables can be set at zero. 
I test to see if there is a difference in favour of MEPs coming from the five largest 
member states and whether the distribution of mega-seats internal to each of the EPP 
and PES Groups is proportional:  
 
 
Log(E(Yoffice)) =  a + b1SIZE_OF_NATIONAL_PARTY_DELEGATION 
+ b2LEFT_RIGHT_DISTANCE_FROM_GROUP_MEAN 
+ b3PRO/ANTI-
INTEGRATION_DISTANCE_FROM_GROUP_MEAN 
+ b4LABOUR (Yes or No) + b5SPD (Yes or No) + … 
 
Yoffice is the dependent variable for the number of mega-seats per national party delegation, b1 is the 
independent variable and b2 onwards are the control variables. 
 
 
While only the sample sizes from the EPP and PES Groups are large enough to 
provide reliable indicators of any bias in the distribution of positions, within these two   30 
groups, the five largest delegations can be attributed responsibilities on the basis of 
their size or according to indicators such as their ideological distance from the mean 
positions of their groups. For each MEP who is a member of one or other of the five 
(six with Poland since 2004) largest delegations within each of the EPP
17 and PES 
Groups, a dummy 1 or 0 variable was entered. Ideological distances from the group 
mean calculated from NOMINATE scores elaborated by the European Parliament 
Research Group’s survey of MEP voting behaviour are entered. These concern left-
right and pro and anti-European integration distances from the group means. 
Tables 6 and 7 show that in gaining mega-seats, in no case are the anti-integration 
distances of the national delegations statistically significant. We can therefore 
conclude that they are not relevant in forecasting the likely attribution of mega-seats 
within the two groups. For the PES, it appears that in 1999-2002, left-right distance 
was statistically significant but only at the .05 level. For the EPP in all cases and for 
the PES since 2004 and in the pooled data, the only results consistently significant at 
below the .01 point are those for the size (number of MEPs) of each national party 
delegation. Therefore the larger the number of MEPs in a delegation, the greater the 
number of mega-seats it will have. In these cases, the standard errors are very 
restrained. Although not significant statistically, the coefficient for number of MEPs 
in a delegation also remained positive for the PES before 2004. 
Within the PES Group, none of the coefficients for the larger national parties before 
2004 is statistically significant. In 2004-2007, Labour and the French PS, PSOE and 
Italian DS-SDI have negative coefficients, statistically significant at below the .1 
point (or .05 for the PSOE). Despite a significant positive coefficient for number of 
MEPs per delegation in the 2004 PES Group, the largest delegations appear to be 
                                                
17 For the EPP coming from Italy: Patto and allies elected in 1994, Forza Italia and UDC since 1999; a 
sixth category coming from Poland, the PO and PSL; and from France, the UDF, 1994-2002, and the 
RPR-UMP since 1999.   31 
relatively disadvantaged. This may be due to a large number of mega-seats going to 
some small delegations, such as the member parties from Belgium, Greece and 
Hungary. This contrasts with the results for the pooled data of the PES between 1994 
and 2007. Here, all coefficients are positive and statistically significant at below the 
.01 point. This suggests that larger delegations are favoured overall. They get 
something every time, unlike the small delegations. But, every time, there are always 
small delegations who get something and undermine proportionality when looking at 
an individual Parliament. For example, Proinsias De Rossa, the sole MEP of the Irish 
Labour Party held a mega-seat throughout the 1999 Parliament, meaning that his 1-
person delegation had a ratio of MEPs to mega-seats of 1.0. This contrasts with the 
British Labour Party, over-represented in mega-seats, whose ratio was 0.3 (9 mega-
seats out of 28 MEPs).   32 
 
Table 6: Poisson regression
18 of PES mega-seats
19 according to national 
party delegation and number of MEPs, 1994-2007 
 
   1994 & 1997 1999 & 2002  2004 & 2007  Pooled
Intercept  -.815(1.163) -2.319(1.093)**  -1.836(.481)***  -.614(.147)***
No of MEPs  .120(.098) .021(.116)  .232(.056)***  .026(.007)***
Labour  -4.390(5.425) 2.046(2.865)  -1.477(.774)*  1.645(.343)***
SPD  -1.347(3.240) 3.531(3.351)  -1.307(.907)  1.833(.278)***
PS (F)  .861(1.589) .429(2.167)  -3.975(1.366)*  1.046(.308)***
PSOE  -1.391(1.382) 3.703(2.550)  -2.350(.996)**  1.440(.273)***
DS-SDI  .475(1.163) 2.113(1.427)  -1.268(.738)*  1.224(.291)***
Left-Right distance  12.484(11.451) 34.558(16.158)**  N/A  N/A
Pro/Anti distance  -7.861(5.854) -1.992(4.430)  N/A  N/A
df  28 31  47  108
N  16 16  25  109
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Dependent variable: the number of mega-seats per national party delegation in the PES Group. 
Baseline: Delegations other than the largest from the PES Group in the five largest member states. 
NOMINATE roll call data, 1994-2001, made available from the “How MEPs Vote” project, funded by 
the Economic and Social Research Council, code L213 25 2019, as part of the ‘One Europe or 
Several?’ series. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18  Poisson regression executed using R Development Core Team (2007). R: A language and 
environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. ISBN 
3-900051-07-0, URL http://www.R-project.org. 
19 Mega-seats defined as: Group leader, President, Vice-President or Quaestor of Parliament, 
Committee Chair, or Group Co-ordinator on Committee. The reported coefficients are for office held 
by national party delegation. For descriptive statistics, see Appendix, Tables A3 to A8.   33 
 
Table  7:  Poisson  regression  of  EPP  seats  according  to  national  party 
delegation and number of MEPs, 1994-2007 
 
   1994 & 1997  1999 & 2002  2004 & 2007  Pooled
Intercept  -1.842(.780)**  -1.171(.679)*  -2.124(.403)***  -1.118(.165)***
No of MEPs  .290(.085)***  .133(.059)**  .193(.046)***  .069(.016)***
Conservatives  -1.846(1.006)*  -.244(2.821)  -.924(.959)  .888(.467)*
CDU-CSU  -8.685(3.130)***  3.284(2.818)  -4.863(1.965)**  .185(.759)
UDF-RPR-UMP  -1.270(1.119)  .573(.826)  -1.162(.870)  .224(.404)
PP  -4.078(1.639)**  -.180(1.429)  -.643(.858)  1.236(.411)***
Patto-Udeur-SVP  -1.538(1.073)  -  -  -1.733(1.010)*
Forza-UDC   -  -.495(1.018)  .171(.564)  .666(.344)*
PO-PSL  -  -  -.830(.789)  .338(.628)
Left-Right distance  -2.472(7.719)  -3.535(3.893)  N/A  N/A
Pro/Anti distance  -1.743(2.058)  -1.040(5.318)  N/A  N/A
Df  31  51  70  159
N  16  26  37  160
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. 
Dependent variable: the number of mega-seats per national party delegation in the EPP Group. 
Baseline: Delegations other than the largest from the EPP Group in the five largest member states. 
NOMINATE roll call data, 1994-2001, made available from the “How MEPs Vote” project, funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council, code L213 25 2019, as part of the ‘One Europe or Several?’ 
series. 
 
Is the EPP any different? As with the PES, when looking at individual Parliaments, the 
coefficients for the larger member parties are predominantly negative, despite the 
consistent finding of statistically significant positive correlations for number of MEPs per 
party. The largest delegation, the German CDU-CSU, is notably under-represented in 
mega-seats in 1994-1997, while the statistical significance and negative coefficient fall 
for both the Spanish PP and British Conservatives. In 2004-2007, again the very large 
German delegation is penalised, with 49 MEPs providing 12 mega-seats. The EPP 
contains a larger number of small parties than the PES, many of whom get something. 
For example, in 2004-2007, the delegation of the Ulster Unionist Party (1 MEP) is also a 
Quaestor, whose ratio of mega-seats to MEPs is 1.0. This is much higher than for the   34 
“powerful” British Conservatives (27 MEPs) whose ratio is 0.3. Again, this skews the 
proportionality in favour of party size when looking at individual Parliaments. The 
pooled data reveal a different story, ironing out disparities in favour of small delegations. 
Here, the large delegations really do all get something every time. The coefficients are 
positive except for the Italian Patto-UDEUR-SVP, who were only present in high 
numbers in the 1994 Parliament. The British Conservatives and Spanish PP are 
particularly well represented in gaining mega-seats.  
This sub-section has found that Hypothesis 2, concerning the proportionality in the 
allocation of mega-seats between delegations within the EPP and PES, is correct, but with 
some qualifications.  Although still high for the PES at .795 and the EPP at .918, the 
correlations for the distribution of mega-seats according to the size of national party 
delegations has fallen from levels above .95 for both groups. The Poisson regressions in 
Tables 6 and 7 have revealed that the size of the delegation is the single most significant 
predictor of the number of mega-seats assigned, which indicates proportionality. The 
pooled data shows that except for one delegation, those coming from the five or six 
largest states and sitting in the EPP or PES are favoured over smaller delegations. The 
results for individual Parliaments differ, since smaller delegations may gain something 
but only on one occasion, while the French, Italian and Spanish parties have, at different 
times, been less active in taking mega-seats than the British and Germans.   35 
  
Conclusion 
 
Positions of influence within the Parliament are shared proportionately between the 
political groups. The larger groups also share out key positions internally, with the 
smaller delegations revolving mega-seats. The smaller groups have more limited access 
to mega-seats, for example the only committee chaired by a Green in 1994 was the 
Women’s Rights and Equal Opportunities Committee, considered the least important. 
Since 1999, the distribution of mega-seats was marginally more proportional between 
groups. This was probably due to fewer fluctuations in the size of groups. However, 
competition between the larger groups was more intense, although elections to committee 
chairs are not contested competitively. Whereas the larger groups agreed to share out key 
committee leadership roles between them, the only important committees controlled by 
the PES after 1999 were Economic and Monetary Affairs, Budgets, and Industry. In 2004 
the PES lost the latter two but gained Internal Market and Consumer Affairs. Increased 
competition took the form of a suspension in logrolling between the two large groups that 
had hitherto been practiced, and by a stricter observance of the D’Hondt formula, which 
is an embedded consensual mechanism for containing competition. 
Proportionality does not apply to the attribution of committee co-ordinators within the 
two large groups. The co-ordinator positions are monopolised by northern Europeans, the 
Spanish and the Greeks, but not the French. However, the disproportionate allocation of 
co-ordinators is not sufficient to distort the more global picture of mega-seats distribution 
within the two large groups (Tables 6 and 7).   36 
The increased legislative powers of the Parliament, competitive partisan dynamic with 
the Council, and increased competition within the Parliament provide a challenge for its 
constituent groups. Any resultant competition is contained by institutionalised power 
sharing. Those national delegations or groups that are either under represented in mega-
seats, including those of co-ordinator or rapporteur (Benedetto 2005), or who hold chairs 
of only minor committees are distanced from influence on outcomes, although this is 
often due to self-exclusion, rather than being the result of a situation with clear winners 
and losers. 
The evidence presented in this paper indicates the correctness of the hypothesis that 
despite a slight increase in competition for mega-seats, the proportional attribution of 
positions remains intact. This can be understood in terms of the pork barrel that assumes 
politicians will need to make alliances with each other in order to secure outcomes, in this 
case, policy or prestige arising from office. However, the role of the separation of powers 
between Parliament and the Council and Commission that are equally divided in terms of 
party and nationality is probably more significant. MEPs will only achieve outcomes they 
desire by either allying with elements in the other institutions, or challenging them 
convincingly. For this to be achieved, the construction of multi-party consensus by 
sharing mega-seats across tendencies is the one of most efficient means. Within rather 
than between the groups, proportionality has survived but declined, particularly since 
2004. The one explanation for this must be the arrival of 162 MEPs from the new 
member states, very few of whom have taken mega-seats. 
In the analysis of the European Parliament, Hix, Kreppel, and Noury (2003), Hix, 
Noury, and Roland (2005); and Kreppel (2000) identify increasing competition between   37 
left and right with regard to legislative decision-making. The application of this 
preconception to the field of legislative office, such as committee chairs, would lead us to 
assume not just a suspension of logrolling between the two large groups, but party based 
competition with visible losers for key committee leadership positions. As this paper has 
shown, such a development has not occurred. This reflects the Parliament’s embedded 
mechanisms for consensus.   38 
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
Table A1: Distribution of co-ordinators within the EPP Group, 1994-2007 
      1994     1997     1999     2002     2004
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗     2007*   
Delegation  State MEPs C
* MEPs  C  MEPs  C  MEPs C MEPs C MEPs C 
CDU-CSU  D  47  8  47  9  53  7  53  4  49  6  49  7 
CCD-CDU-UDC I  -   -   4  0  5  0  5  0  5  0  5  0 
CDA  NL  10  3  9  1  9  2  9  2  7  2  7  2 
Conservatives  GB  18  2  18  3  36  3  35  3  26  5  26  7 
CVP-PSC-CSP  B  7  1  7  1  6  0  6  0  6  0  6  0 
Fine Gael  IRL  4  0  4  0  4  0  4  0  5  1  5  1 
Forza Italia  I   -  -   -   -   22  0  23  0  16  1  16  1 
KDS  S  -  -  -  0  2  0  2  0  2  0  2  0 
KF  DK  3  0  3  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0 
KOK  FIN   -  -   4  0  4  0  4  0  4  0  4  0 
MSP  S   -  -   5  0  5  0  5  0  4  0  4  0 
ND  EL  9  1  9  1  9  0  9  2  11  2  11  0 
ÖVP  A   -  -   7  0  7  1  7  2  6  1  6  0 
PP  E   28  4  28  5  27  4  27  4  24  5  24  4 
PCS  L  2  0  2  1  2  0  2  0  3  0  3  0 
Pensionati  I  -  -  -  -  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0 
Patto-UDEUR  I  12  0  11  0  7  0  7  0  2  0  2  0 
PSD-PP-CDS  P   -  -   9  0  9  0  9  0  9  0  9  0 
RPR-UMP  F   -  -   -   -   12  0  11  0  17  0  17  0 
Scallon  IRL   -  -   -   -   1  0  1  0  -  -  -  - 
SKL  FIN   -  -   -   -   1  0  1  0  -  -  -  - 
UDC  E  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  -  -  -  - 
UDF  F  13  1  13  0  9  0  9  1  -  -  -  - 
UUP  NI  1  0        1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0 
TOTAL     155  20  181  20  233  17  232  18  266  23  277  23 
 
                                                 
∗ It should be noted that the EPP’s MEPs from the ten new member states totalled 69, but none of them 
were selected as coordinators in either 2004 or 2007. 
* C denotes the number of co-ordinators.   41 
 
Table A2: Distribution of co-ordinators 
within the PES Group, 1994-2007 
      1994     1997     1999     2002     2004
*    2007*   
Delegation State MEPs  C  MEPs  C  MEPs  C  MEPs  C  MEPs C MEPs C 
Labour  GB  63  8  63  8  29  6  28  6  19  2  19  2 
Labour  IRL  1  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1  0 
MSzP  H  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  9  0  9  1 
PASOK  EL  10  0  10  0  9  0  9  0  8  1  8  0 
PDS-SI  I   19  2  19  4  16  0  15  0  16  1  14  1 
POSL  L  2  0  2  0  2  1  2  1  1  0  1  0 
PS  F  16  1  15  0  22  0  22  1  31  2  31  2 
PS  P  10  1  10  0  12  0  12  0  12  1  12  1 
PS-SP  B  6  1  6  0  5  0  5  0  6  1  6  2 
PSOE  E  21  0  21  0  24  4  24  4  24  2  24  2 
PvdA  NL  8  1  7  1  6  1  6  0  7  1  7  2 
S  DK  4  0  4  0  3  0  2  0  5  0  5  0 
SAP  S  -  -  7  0  7  0  7  0  5  0  5  0 
SDLP  NI  1  0  1  0  1  0  1  0  -  -  -  - 
SDP  FIN  -   -  6  0  3  0  3  0  3  1  3  0 
SPD  D  40  6  40  7  33  4  35  4  23  6  23  6 
SPÖ  A  -   -  4  0  7  0  7  0  7  2  7  1 
TOTAL     201  20  216  20  180  17  179  17  199  20  217  20 
 
 
                                                 
* Of the 31 PES MEPs from the ten new member states, none were selected as coordinators in 2004. One 
Hungarian Social Democrat was selected in 2007.   42 
Table A3: Distribution of office (mega-seats)
* within the EPP group by 
national party delegation, 1994 and 1997 
    1994    1997    NOMINATE scores 
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices  Left-Right Pro or Anti 
CDA  NL  10  4  10  2  0.027  0.023 
CCD-CDU  I  -  -  4  1  0.086  0.346 
CDU-CSU  D  46  12  46  13  0.027  0.127 
Conservatives  GB  18  3  18  4  0.059  0.077 
CVP-PSC-CSP  B  7  2  7  1  0.025  0.075 
Fine Gael  IRL  4  0  4  0  0.037  0.003 
KF  DK  3  1  3  0  0.001  0.077 
KOK  FIN  -  -  4  0  0.016  0.128 
Moderaterna  S  -  -  5  0  0.056  0.126 
ND  EL  9  2  9  2  0.016  0.001 
ÖVP  A  -  -  7  0  0.031  0.076 
Partido Popular  E  28  7  28  9  0.001  0.068 
PCS  L  2  0  2  1  0.022  0.020 
Patto  I  12  1  11  0  0.052  0.019 
PSD  P  -  -  9  1  0.130  0.324 
UDC  E  1  0  1  0  0.506  0.532 
UDF  F  13  3  13  1  0.027  0.339 
UUP  NI  1  0  -  -  0.119  0.868 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: .959 
                                                 
* Group leader, President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors of Parliament, committee chairs, group co-
ordinators on committees.   43 
 
Table A4: Distribution of mega-seats within the PES group by national 
party delegation, 1994 and 1997 
    1994    1997    NOMINATE scores 
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices  Left-Right Pro or Anti 
Labour  GB  63  14  63  13  0.063  0.070 
Irish Labour  IRL  1  0  1  0  0.065  0.153 
PASOK  EL  10  1  10  1  0.043  0.137 
PDS-SI  I  19  4  19  6  0.042  0.094 
POSL  L  2  1  2  1  0.046  0.166 
PS (F)  F  16  3  15  2  0.080  0.254 
PS (P)  P  10  3  10  1  0.028  0.034 
PS-SP (B)  B  6  1  6  0  0.058  0.175 
PSOE  E  21  2  21  2  0.057  0.042 
PvdA  NL  8  1  7  2  0.079  0.067 
S  DK  4  0  4  0  0.027  0.226 
SAP  S  -  -  7  0  0.032  0.127 
SDLP  NI  1  0  1  0  0.005  0.059 
SDP  FIN  -  -  4  1  0.015  0.089 
SPD  D  40  9  40  9  0.000  0.057 
SPÖ  A  -  -  6  0  0.005  0.102 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: 0.978   44 
 
Table A5: Distribution of mega-seats within the EPP/ED Group by national 
party delegation, 1999 and 2002 
    1999    2002    NOMINATE scores 
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices  Left-Right  Pro or Anti 
CDU-CSU  D  53  12  53  12  0.013  0.085 
CCD-CDU  I  4  1  4  1  0.032  0.076 
CDA  NL  9  2  9  2  0.110  0.084 
Conservatives  GB  36  5  35  6  0.321  0.468 
CVP-PSC-CSP  B  6  0  6  0  0.190  0.087 
Fine Gael  IRL  4  1  4  1  0.119  0.090 
Forza Italia  I  22  2  22  2  0.049  0.089 
KDS  S  2  0  2  0  0.381  0.150 
KF  DK  1  0  1  0  0.023  0.117 
KOK  FIN  4  0  4  0  0.029  0.022 
MSP  S  5  0  5  1  0.050  0.085 
ND  EL  9  1  9  1  0.076  0.070 
ÖVP  A  7  0  7  1  0.078  0.099 
Pensionati  I  1  0  1  0  0.092  0.046 
PP  E  27  7  27  6  0.058  0.170 
PCS  L  2  0  2  0  0.076  0.009 
Democratici-Udeur I  7  0  7  0  0.160  0.081 
PSD  P  9  1  9  1  0.056  0.073 
RPR  F  12  0  11  1  0.038  0.077 
Scallon  IRL  1  0  1  0  0.034  0.233 
SKL  FIN  1  0  1  0  0.181  0.019 
UDC  E  1  0  1  0  0.218  0.087 
UDF  F  9  1  9  0  0.118  0.102 
UUP  NI  1  0  1  0  0.362  0.418 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: 0.948   45 
 
Table A6: Distribution of mega-seats within the PES Group by national 
party delegation, 1999 and 2002 
    1999    2002    NOMINATE scores 
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices  Left-Right  Pro or Anti 
DS-SDI  I  17  2  16  2  0.020  0.067 
Labour  GB  29  9  28  8  0.063  0.184 
Labour  IRL  1  1  1  1  0.033  0.029 
PASOK  EL  9  0  9  1  0.045  0.047 
POSL  L  2  2  2  2  0.096  0.288 
PS  F  22  2  22  2  0.070  0.145 
PS  P  12  1  12  0  0.011  0.047 
PS-SP  B  5  2  5  0  0.067  0.139 
PSOE  E  24  7  24  6  0.016  0.280 
PvdA  NL  6  0  6  0  0.002  0.017 
S  DK  3  0  2  0  0.037  0.372 
SAP  S  6  1  6  0  0.038  0.259 
SDLP  NI  1  0  1  0  0.035  0.068 
SDP  FIN  3  0  3  0  0.008  0.038 
SPD  D  33  6  35  6  0.003  0.116 
SPÖ  A  7  0  7  0  0.007  0.085 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: 0.842   46 
 
Table A7: Distribution of mega-seats within the EPP/ED Group by national 
party delegation, 2004 and 2007 
    2004    2007   
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices 
CDA  NL  7  2  7  2 
CDU-CSU  D  49  12  49  12 
CD&V-CDH-CSP  B  6  0  6  0 
Cons  GB  27  7  27  9 
DISO-GTE  CY  3  0  3  0 
EIL  EE  1  0  1  0 
Fidesz-MDF  H  13  0  13  0 
FG  IRL  5  1  5  1 
Forza  I  16  3  16  4 
JL  LV  2  0  2  0 
KDH-SDK  SK  6  1  6  1 
KDS  S  2  0  2  0 
KDU  CZ  2  0  2  0 
KF  DK  1  0  1  0 
KOK  FIN  4  0  4  0 
MSP  S  4  0  4  0 
ND  EL  11  3  11  1 
NSi-SDS  SL  4  0  4  0 
ODS-SNK  CZ  12  1  12  1 
ÖVP  A  6  1  6  0 
Pensionati (I)  I  1  0  1  0 
PCS  L  3  1  3  1 
PD  RO  -  -  6  0 
PP  E  24  7  24  6 
PN  MT  2  0  2  0 
PO-PSL  PL  19  2  15  1 
PSD-PP-CDS  P  9  0  9  0 
SMK  SK  2  0  2  0 
SVP  I  1  0  1  0 
TP  LV  1  0  1  0 
TS  LT  2  0  2  0 
UDC  I  5  0  5  0 
UDEUR  I  1  0  1  0 
UDF  BG  -  -  4  0 
UDMR  RO  -  -  3  0 
UMP  F  17  1  17  1 
UUP  NI  1  1  1  1 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: 0.918   47 
 
 
Table A8: Distribution of mega-seats within the PES Group by national 
party delegation, 2004 and 2007 
    2004    2007   
  State  MEPs  Offices  MEPs  Offices 
BSP  BG  -  -  6  0 
CSSD  CZ  2  0  2  0 
DS-SDI  I  16  2  14  1 
Labour  GB  19  3  19  3 
Labour  IRL  1  0  1  0 
Labour  MT  3  0  3  0 
LSD  LT  2  0  2  0 
MSzP  H  9  1  9  2 
PASOK  EL  8  2  8  1 
POSL  L  1  0  1  0 
PS  F  31  4  31  4 
PS  P  12  2  12  2 
PS-SP  B  7  2  7  3 
PSD  RO  -  -  12  0 
PSOE  E  24  4  24  4 
PvdA  NL  7  1  7  2 
S  DK  5  0  5  0 
SAP  S  5  0  5  1 
SDE  EE  3  0  3  0 
SDP  FIN  3  1  3  1 
SLD-SDP  PL  8  1  9  1 
Smer  SK  3  0  3  0 
SPD  D  23  9  23  9 
SPÖ  A  7  2  7  2 
ZLSD  SL  1  0  1  0 
Correlation of mega-seats to national party delegation: 0.795 
 
 